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gPresident Donald Trump Voters Prepared to seek a negotiated settlement to end the worst European war since 1945, he faced a counterpart with real bargaining power in Russia. Over the three decades since the end of the Cold War Russia has become a serious international player. It has more military-industrial capabilities than Europe. and is one of the largest ground forces in the world. As well as having the world’s second-largest nuclear arsenal, Russia has also coordinated its war effort against Ukraine with Iran, China and North Korea. to create a new Eurasian Axis
Peace talks are due to begin at a time when American and European forces are providing military assistance to Kiev. But Russian forces were advancing westward. And Ukrainian resistance is close to breaking point. As former Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba tell at Financial Times Most recently, “If we continue like this, we will lose the war.”
Although many in the Republican Party question this fact, the United States has a primary interest in Ukraine’s survival and a sustainable settlement. With the largest population of any country in Eastern Europe besides poland Ukraine therefore has important mineral resources and is a major exporter of agricultural products. Even though the country was poor from the war But the country has also developed an impressive defense technology sector.
If Russia succeeds in invading The Baltic states will also be in line. Russia may also have recently intervened in Romania. Election In its attempt to install a pro-Kremlin president, in short, there is no reason to expect that Russia’s ambitions will stop on Ukraine’s western border. Trump expresses skepticism about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization But the best way to prevent Moscow from testing the treaty’s Mutual Protection Article 5 is to maintain an independent Ukraine. It must be learned from history that Russia does not negotiate in good faith. But diplomacy is seen more as a way to stagnate than to resolve conflicts. to build military power and split the alliance
If the United States wants to end the Ukraine war in a way that serves American interests, it must counter Russia’s strategy. and build military power Including the economy, above Russia, this will require not only increasing aid to Ukraine and tightening the sanctions regime. But it also comes at a cost to Russia and its allies across Eurasia. including in Europe, the Middle East and the Pacific region.
This process is stressful and risky. Washington must guarantee that Kyiv avoids the trap of a ceasefire and reaches a tenable agreement. America’s favorite thing is Russian President Vladimir Putin’s position has been weakened by the sudden collapse of his protégé Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. That’s a weakness Trump must exploit now.
WEastern Diplomat There is a tendency to view fighting and talking as completely different. When they started negotiations They usually determine the minimum possible position first. Then the concession was given as a sign of honesty. The Russian tradition of strategic thinking has a rather different approach to diplomacy. Since the early years of the soviet union Moscow views war and political action as including diplomacy as one Negotiation is just another tool to improve one’s political position. The objective, like any military operation, remains the suppression of the enemy, or at least its exhaustion.
Moscow’s negotiators rarely see negotiations as a path to a real, lasting agreement. At least not at first. Russian diplomats, on the other hand, tried to control the pace of negotiations in an attempt to subdue their enemies psychologically. They are also likely to try to divide the United States from its allies.
This approach has clear Cold War precedent. in Korea and Vietnam The Soviet Union and its allies stalled negotiations. By insisting on the most pretentious points. They accused the United States of being dishonest and began with the bizarre demand that if the United States responded to them, It is equivalent to surrendering. After the mid-1960s, the Soviets understood the special risks of a general war with NATO. The Soviet Union used its relative strength in the mid-to-late ’70s to support Warsaw Pact satellites. especially East Germany and Poland. Instead, negotiate directly with your West German neighbors. At the same time, they continued to support Western European communism in Italy and elsewhere and intensified their military threats. Moscow therefore aims to divide the region. It was hoped that a series of bilateral contacts in Europe would undermine the unity of the Atlantic Alliance.
US response There are clear risks. The Reagan administration’s military buildup directly challenged Soviet conventional offensive forces. Although the expansion of the US nuclear installation It will stimulate large-scale protest movements in Europe. Fortunately, the political balance in Germany changed with Helmut. Kohl became prime minister in 1982, restoring alliance unity. At the time of the appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev’s ascension to Soviet leadership in 1985 ushered in an unusual period in which Moscow made unparalleled concessions abroad in hopes of hastening reforms at home. (Gorbachev Bachev may be fondly remembered in the Western world. But now he is reviled in Russia)
From the Russian perspective The war with Ukraine is one aspect of the wider war with the West. Ukraine’s resistance would not last long without NATO’s support, making NATO collaboration vital to Ukraine’s future. Russia’s negotiating strategy will focus on undermining this unity.
Of course, this has been Russia’s strategy since the 2014 Minsk Process. It was a slap-in-the-face negotiation attempt midwifed by Franco-German ambitions. This ensures that Ukraine’s status remains in limbo. Russia’s strategy failed only because Ukrainian society remained firmly pro-Western. This is supported by the economic opportunities that the EU offers. and is hampered by Russia’s disastrous management of its representative state in the Donbass region. But Moscow has succeeded in suppressing the Ukraine-NATO debate. and prevent Kiev’s military reinforcements.
A revised Minsk agreement would be virtually impossible in practice. Due to a Russian invasion in 2022, Russia will become a clear belligerent in its own right. In the same way The annexation of Ukrainian territory gave rise to the concept of “Autonomous Region” is not relevant. So what deals should the new Trump administration aim for?
ohCampaign TrailTrump gave the impression he could end the war overnight. A more realistic goal is a ceasefire by next March.
The drastic military desertion has created an incentive for Putin to enter negotiations. Despite progress on the battlefield But Russian manpower was lost. Running up to 45,000 per month– at least The Russian army had to pause to rebuild its forces. Especially if Ukraine is able to maintain its current position in the east in the coming months. Russia is also likely to join the talks.
That will be the easy part. Challenges for US policy It is not just about bringing Russia and Ukraine to the negotiating table. But it also keeps them there. And ensuring that the ceasefire means more than just a tactical ceasefire for Moscow.
Because Putin has asked the question over and over again. righteousness of President Volodymyr Zelensky’s government, the Kremlin may open by calling for bilateral talks with the West. and denied Zelensky’s involvement. If in the beginning several months Trump administration increases aid to Kyiv Especially to allow Ukraine to attack Russian territory with Western weapons. That should overcome Moscow’s opposition to Ukraine’s involvement.
Russia will undoubtedly present a set of extreme demands. These are likely to include: halting Ukraine’s negotiations on NATO membership; Neutrality is written into Ukraine’s constitution. Special privileges for Russian speakers Lifting restrictions on the Russian Orthodox Church (de facto agency of Russia’s intelligence service in Ukraine); Accepting responsibility for “Donbas Genocide” used by Russia as a cause and withdrew from territories in the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhia regions.
No Ukrainian president can accept these demands. Russia understands this—the goal is to portray Ukraine as uncompromising. as an excuse to obstruct negotiations at the same time Russia would almost certainly undermine any ceasefire. However, it took advantage of weak surveillance and enforcement mechanisms to threaten Ukrainian forces. This will demoralize war-weary Ukrainians. Hopeless for a lasting ceasefire and a final settlement. Russia may try to distort negotiations by halting attacks on Ukraine’s energy sector. to show fake goodwill and called on the United States Prevent Kiev from attacking Russian territory in return. This will affect Russia’s tactical advantage in frontline combat.
Russia also wants major restrictions. It is also about Ukraine’s military capabilities and capabilities. For Kyiv, resisting disarmament will be crucial to the country’s future. Despite wartime shortages and disruptions, But Ukraine’s defense industry is developing at a remarkable rate. Kyiv has concluded a series of defense treaties across Europe. Some of this includes direct funding for Ukrainian industry. But Ukraine cannot reap the full benefits of these deals until it can protect its industry from bombing and rearm its military.
To reach a meaningful settlement, the United States will need to build power more broadly. It links Russia’s position in Ukraine with other interests. Four reasonable steps: Rising pressure in the Middle East Disruption of Russian cooperation in Asia Clear recognition of the United States to European-led security initiatives and taking advantage of China’s reliance on Russia to support the economy.
Recent events have created beneficial opportunities to score first points. Russia’s position in the Middle East and Africa has become weak. By supporting Assad and gaining access to air and navy bases in Syria. Russia has built military bridges through Crimea, the Levant, and Libya and into Africa. in which a group of Russian mercenaries controls valuable mineral deposits and protects Russian-owned assets. But Russia’s position in the Middle East and Africa suddenly appears weak. Russia needs Iran to sustain its war effort in Ukraine and avoid Western sanctions. So the more Israel can destroy Iran, the more likely it will be. The less productive relations between Moscow and Tehran will be, the more likely it will be. And if there is no coalition that controls Syria Russia will also struggle to maintain influence in Africa.
The United States could also block Russian cooperation with North Korea, Georgia, and Belarus. North Korean artillery shells have become essential to Russia’s war effort. And North Korean troops are now fighting Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region. Military support requires a response: The new Trump administration should return to policy Previous “maximum pressure” to increase Pyongyang’s costs of aiding Moscow, the United States should rely on Georgia as well. Sanctions were passed on the basis of evidence of fraud in the last election, which returned the country to the status of a proxy for Russia. In the same way US support For the Belarusian opposition to President Alexander’s regime Lukashenko can step up.
As a third step, the United States should consider including some European powers in opening negotiations with Ukraine. Most relevant are Poland, Finland and the Baltic states, which have demonstrated Ukraine’s military capabilities and commitment to national defense. Guarantees of future stability for Ukraine must involve these states. Because the US military It will definitely not be relevant. And the most effective use against Russia today might be to accelerate Europe’s rearmament.
Finally, the United States must get serious about China’s enormous support for Russia’s war effort. Trump clearly intends to resume his trade war with China, this time. Such efforts should immediately target Chinese companies involved in Russian military machinery and face secondary sanctions.
War is easy to start but difficult to stop. But combining these four elements provides lasting military and economic support for Ukraine. It would give Washington an opportunity to keep Russia at the negotiating table. No one entrusted by Trump to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine should expect overnight success. The challenge is to overcome Russia’s tried and tested method of cynically exploiting negotiations to gain a military advantage.
Starting negotiations should not mean ending military and economic pressure. But it means the end of negotiations. The new Trump presidency will be a pivotal moment for the United States. and alliances in becoming more interdependent Not only in Russia but also to the Eurasian Axis as a whole.
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